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
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
THE YUGOSLAV ALL-PEOPLE'S DEFENSE
SYSTEM: A PESSIMISTIC APPRAISAL

Douglas A. Frazee



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

THE YUGOSLAV ALL-PEOPLE'S DEFENSE SYSTEM:
A PESSIMISTIC APPRAISAL

by

Douglas A. Frazee

June 1981

Thesis Advisor:

J. Valenta

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The All-People's Defense system suffers from various deficiencies as do other defense strategies. It is, however, the strategy that best fulfills the economic, political, and military demands for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

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The Yugoslav All-People's Defense System:
A Pessimistic Appraisal

by

Douglas A. Frazee
Captain, United States Army
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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June 1981

ABSTRACT

The Yugoslav All-People's Defense System is designed to project cooperation and unity, to prepare the society for long-lasting resistance, and to equip and to train the entire nation for defense, while deterring all possible invaders.

The two most important factors in the All-People's Defense system are will power and fire power: the intangible and the tangible. This study examines these factors and evaluates their impact on the All-People's Defense system. The willingness to fight for Yugoslavia rather than the constituent republics and regions - is always in doubt. Fire power - the ability of the Yugoslav economic system to project material strength through agriculture, communications, industry, and transport - is questionable.

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I. INTRODUCTION

With the passing of Tito, Yugoslavia may well feel threatened by the Soviet Union. This threat can manifest itself politically, economically, militarily, or a combination thereof. This study will, however, concern itself only with the military threat, and the ability of the Yugoslav All-People's Defense (APD) to withstand that Soviet military invasion.

The purpose of this study is to take a critical look at the APD, the will of the people, and the economic capabilities, and to make an evaluation of the credibility of the APD in the scenario of a Soviet invasion. For this to be accomplished two major assumptions must be made. Soviet decision-makers have determined that the benefits are worth the risk and cost. The world reaction will be no more than that which was experienced following the actions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. The second assumption is that the Soviets were not invited into the country by any segment of Yugoslav government or party.

A person unfamiliar with the geostrategic importance of the Balkans may well ask, "Why a concern over Yugoslavia - is it not already a communist country?" It is, but it is not aligned with the Soviet Union; and, it does not belong to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). Yugoslavia, the largest

of the Balkan countries, sits astride the military, economic, and communications lines that connect Europe and the Soviet Union with Africa and the Middle East. Soviet control of Yugoslavia may well fill the void created by the loss of influence in Egypt; by-pass the Montreaux Convention with ports on the Adriatic; resurrect communist guerrilla problems for Greece, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and place political, as well as economic pressure on Italy and Austria. Soviet gains in this area are NATO's losses.

Yugoslavia proposes to prevent military invasion by East or West with the All-People's Defense (APD) system. The APD calls upon every man, woman, child, and organization to defend Yugoslavia. It incorporates conventional as well as unconventional (guerrilla) warfare into the defense, proposing to make military occupation by the invader a necessity - a long arduous occupation meeting active and passive resistance from all segments of Yugoslav society.

For this to be accomplished successfully, Yugoslavia must have not only the will of the people but the wherewithal to support the APD. There are enough indicators present today to raise doubt about the credibility of the APD. Political loyalties to Yugoslavia, as opposed to its constituent nations, are fragile and the economy worsens, driving a wedge between the doubting republics even deeper.

Does the APD really project the desired military deterrent? What are the weaknesses of the APD? Will the people join together in the defense of Yugoslavia, or will there be a recurrence of the problems present in WW II - internecine struggle with Yugoslav killing Yugoslav? Can the fractured and fragile economy support a military defense? Has the nonaligned political position isolated Yugoslavia from assistance? Is the transportation and communications infrastructure adequate for defense and subsequent counter-offense? Has urbanization with its demographic changes in population changed value systems that will affect the APD? Can the Yugoslav economy support the APD with food, weapons, ammunition, and clothing? These and other questions will be examined in this study.

Chapter II depicts a hypothetical combined WTO and Soviet attack. The task organization of the invading force is designed to permit speed, mobility, and mass which will administer a coup de grace within a short period of time. A very broad look at the Yugoslav order of battle follows. Glaring weaknesses are found in the command and control procedures as well as the weapons systems.

Chapter III illustrates the historical ethnic differences with Yugoslavia. The present day difficulties in Kosovo, an autonomous province in southern Serbia, bring these animosities into perspective. Cooperation and unity between Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), an equal partner with the Yugoslav

People's Army (YPA) in the APD, depends on the ability of these Yugoslav nations to place national interests above those of the republics. This cooperation, or lack thereof, is the most vital ingredient to a successful APD strategy.

Chapter IV broadly examines the regional economic disparities, transportation infrastructure, agriculture production, demographic changes, domestic weapons production, and their potential effects on the APD. The system, to function, must unite the will of the people with the material of war. This chapter proposes that Yugoslavia does not have the economic strength to support the APD during peacetime or wartime. Yugoslavia will not be able to support a prolonged defense without assistance from external sources.

The final chapter summarizes the paper and concludes that even with ethnic and economic weaknesses within Yugoslavia, the APD is still the best defensive strategy that the medium-sized state can support.

The author gratefully appreciates the guidance, counseling, and assistance provided by Dr. Jiri Valenta, Coordinator, Soviet and East European Studies, National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. It was largely through his efforts that I was able to have access to the following knowledgeable individuals: Dr. A. Ross Johnson, a senior analyst of Yugoslavia, RAND Corporation; Dr. John C. Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. Wayne Vucinich, Stanford University; Ambassador Raymond Garthoff; Hungarian

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II. SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN YUGOSLAVIA: POLARKA REVISITED

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) relies on a total defense system to serve as a deterrent against any possible invasion. The All-People's Defense (APD) system incorporates federal forces, the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) with Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), and Civil Defense (CD). These forces are able to move from conventional warfare to unconventional warfare and back again bringing every man, woman, and child into the defense. The APD, however, is untested in battle. This chapter depicts a hypothetical attack by the Warsaw Pact (WP) armies and the defense of Yugoslavia by the APD.

Yugoslavia, the largest Balkan State, has two ingredients of a confrontation area: political uncertainty and high geostrategic value. Since 1948, when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Comintern, the SFRY has developed its own road to socialism. Efforts by the Soviet Union to seek rapprochement have often led to increased, rather than decreased, tensions between these communist nations. The Hungarian crisis and the invasion of Czechoslovakia were indirect results of the rapprochement effort. With the Belgrade Declaration of 1955, the Soviet Union implied recognition of Titoism. That, coupled with the de-Stalinization effort by Khrushchev, suggested that

the Soviet Union would permit a "separate road" to communism in other countries as well as Yugoslavia.

Over the years the relationship has ebbed and flowed as the SFRY has attempted to remain independent and nonaligned while not offending either super power. Yet, to the Soviet Union it has appeared that Yugoslavia has moved closer to the European neutrals and Mediterranean neighbors than a nonaligned communist nation should. Apparently, a factor in the Soviet decision to invade (hypothetical), was the feeling that the order of modifiers used by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Milos Minic, "Yugoslavia is a European, Mediterranean, non-aligned and developing country"¹ accurately reflects Yugoslav attitudes.

Does the Soviet Union hold the heretical SFRY responsible for the adverse actions of some WP nations? The Soviet Union has watched Nicolai Ceausescu, of Romania, develop an autonomous foreign policy which, of late, has been in conflict with the Soviet Union. Poland, experiencing severe economic problems, appears to be seeking a solution similar to the Yugoslav "self-management" economic program where the workers have considerable influence in the planning and management of the economy. The Soviet Union hopes to demonstrate to potential deviants that this form of communism will no longer be permitted to contaminate the system.

Yugoslavia is strategically nestled in the Balkans amidst seven nations. Three of them, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria,

are members of the Warsaw Pact; two of them, Italy and Greece, are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); while Austria, a non-communist nation, and Albania, a communist nation, remain neutral. An independent and nonaligned Yugoslavia permits "business as usual." A Yugoslavia, performing as a member of the Warsaw Pact, however, changes the strategic balance in the Mediterranean. The southern NATO flank, Greece and Turkey, will be isolated and inherently weakened. The threat to the west would be increased; the envelopment of West Germany would also be enhanced.

Yet, the most concrete benefit is the acquisition of warm water ports in the Mediterranean (Adriatic), a centuries old ambition of Russia. Kotor, Rijeka (Fiume), and Split would provide naval bases that would be unencumbered by the Montreaux Convention of 1936.² The land route to the Mediterranean would be established; and, air bases, that would assist in influencing Africa and the Middle East, and would provide air support for the Mediterranean (Black Sea) fleet, would now be under Soviet control.

Yugoslavia is primarily a country of hills and mountains which would influence the military operations (Fig. 1). The only significant lowland is the large Pannonian plain in the north. Except for this lowland the country is made up of rugged highlands having numerous mountain peaks and ridges, narrow steep-sided valleys, and scattered nearly level basins. Elevations reach nearly 9,400 feet in the northwest. The lowland



Figure 1. Physical Map of Yugoslavia

hills and plains, containing the majority of Yugoslavia's commercial agricultural land, cover about one-third of the area and form a rough oval from Zagreb, Croatia, in the northwest to Nis, Serbia, in the east. A few minor mountain ranges interrupt these lowlands. Mineral, metal, and timber exploitation are important activities there. The chief mountain chain, the Dinaric Alps, runs parallel to the Adriatic coast.

Much of this rugged terrain along the Adriatic Sea is characterized by underground drainage and caverns, shallow sinkholes, deep narrow valleys, cliffs and depressions with relatively flat floors and steep sides.

Closely spaced urban and rural settlements are connected by a network of roads and railways in the plains area. Cities other than Belgrade and Zagreb are generally small, have densely built-up cores, and include residential suburbs that have concentrations of industry.

An irregularly shaped, elongated country, Yugoslavia occupies a northwest to southeast area of about 98,000 square miles, a size comparable to Wyoming. The country is the largest of the Balkans and is about 550 statute miles long; its greatest width is 260 miles. The country becomes hard to defend not only because of its length but also because of the required long lines of communications. Given an attack from the east bloc nations, it is assumed that one third of the nation, the northern plains, would soon be lost. The defense of Yugoslavia would be conducted, as in the past,

from the mountains which dominate the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, as well as parts of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia.

Yugoslavia is interestingly similar to Afghanistan in four distinct ways. Both nations profess to be nonaligned: they border on the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc; they have defensible mountain terrain; and finally, both nations have a deep-rooted warrior tradition. If history is any true indicator, the Yugoslav warrior will fight; but, as chapter three will illustrate, he often fights against another Yugoslav warrior.

Added to the knowledge gained from the invasion of Afghanistan, a study of the terrain and the defense system of Yugoslavia will dictate a specific tailoring of the invading force: armor, mechanized infantry, airmobile, and airborne units to capitalize on speed, firepower, and mobility. As B-H Liddlell Hart point out in History of the Second World War, the German armored forces had been as "irresistible as in the plains of Poland and France, despite the Yugoslav mountain obstacles they met."³ Mechanized forces should perform as well today. Forces from Bulgaria and Hungary may be mixed with Soviet forces to project a Warsaw Pact solidarity and to take advantage of any irridentist leanings with the ethnic populations of Macedonia and Vojvodina. The suggested annexation of these areas, similar to World War II, (See Chap. 3, p. 43) may provide incentives to these nations.⁴

In order to reach the tactical force ratio (Fig. 2) of 40-45 divisions⁵ the Soviet Union needs to draw upon not only the forces from Bulgaria and Hungary, but also from Soviet forces stationed in the northern tier of the Warsaw Pact and the southern and eastern areas of the USSR. Bulgaria would probably provide four motorized rifle divisions (MRD) and three tank brigades; Hungary would probably provide three MRD and two tank brigades. That represents approximately half of their respective forces.⁶

These 40-45 divisions would be under the operational control of a Front (Fig. 3). These combat divisions assigned to the Front are further assigned to armies. A large Front might have as many as seven armies with up to 40 divisions. Armies, tank or combined arms, are to drive rapidly toward "deep objectives," destroy any enemy strategic reserves, or maneuver rapidly to the flanks to encircle large enemy groupings.⁷

With the above information, an attack can be hypothesized:

Avenue of Approach 1: Three armies, with 14 divisions, attack from western Hungary toward Rijeka, to secure Zagreb and Ljubljana, and the Dalmation coast from Zadar to Dubrovnik;

Avenue of Approach 2: Three armies, with 20 divisions, attack from eastern Hungary to secure Belgrade, Sarajevo, and the resources near Manja Luka;

Avenue of Approach 3: One army, with 7 divisions, attacks from Bulgaria up the Morava valley to secure Nis and assist in the Belgrade operation and to secure Skoplje and the Vardar valley;





Figure 2. Desired Soviet Tactical Force Ratios

SOURCE: Soviet Army Operations, Department of the Army, p. 3-81.



*A typical front could have three or four combined arms armies and one or two tank armies.

Figure 3. A Typical Soviet Front

SOURCE: Organization and Equipment of the Soviet Army, Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 31 July 1978, P. 1-1.

- * Airborne and airmobile operations would be conducted on and around Sarajevo to prevent withdrawal of SFRY troops
- ** Naval operations would be conducted near the Strait of Otranto to signal that resupply of Yugoslavia will not be tolerated⁸ (Fig. 4).

If successful, the Warsaw Pact armies will have secured the political headquarters of the major republics, enveloped the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), secured the natural resources in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and controlled the port facilities at Rijeka, Split, and Kotor. Speed and surprise are of paramount importance.

Will the Yugoslav Defense system defeat the threat? Ever since the Comintern expelled Yugoslavia, the SFRY has attempted to design a defense system that will secure their position as an independent and nonaligned nation. During the years preceding the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the SFRY had relied on a conventional military force, the YPA.

Following that invasion, the leaders of Yugoslavia realized they would need to revise and upgrade their defense system. The old system was very expensive, consuming over 22 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP),⁹ out of date with the internal socio-ethnic changes being made in Yugoslavia and judged by Yugoslav military leaders to be ineffective against the Warsaw Pact armies.

In 1969, the SFRY passed the National Defense Act and reinstituted the "Partisan" concept of war: All-People's Defense (APD). This enabled the government to reduce federal




Figure 4. Three Possible Major Avenues of Approach for the Invasion of Yugoslavia

outlays for defense to 6 percent of GDP; to decentralize the military and bring it into harmony with political and economical decentralization; and, to create a credible deterrent that capitalizes on the warrior tradition of the South Slavs.¹⁰ The National Defense Act included not only the YPA but created the TDF and Civil Defense (CD).

The organizational structure of the APD made the YPA and the TDF equal under the command of the General Staff (Fig. 5). The YPA continues to represent the SFRY as the nation's active military force. The TDF, however, is organized at republic, autonomous province, commune and other socio-political community levels. It is responsible for organizing, developing, and equipping its armed forces - to include weapons, military equipment, manning, logistic support and other needs.¹¹

The APD functions with six army regions, a naval region and an independent military region (Fig. 6). There is a close correlation between the army regions and the republics. Within the army region there are normally three to four military regions which, in turn, consist of military districts. (This does not reflect the tactical disposition of the Yugoslav forces.) These commands are responsible for the administration, logistics, and the planning and execution of the mobilization of their territories.¹²

The strength of the total armed forces is 259,000 (145,000 conscripts) of which the army has 190,000 men (130,000 conscripts). They are organized as follows:

Yugoslav National Defense System




Figure 5. Composition of the Yugoslav National Defense System

SOURCE: Milan N. Vego, "Yugoslav Ground Forces: A Look at the Past and Present," Military Review 15 (November 1980); 21.

Army Region Commands in Yugoslavia




Figure 6. The Administrative Army Region Commands

SOURCE: Vego, "Yugoslav Ground Forces," p. 22.

- 8 infantry divisions
- 7 independent tank brigades
- 12 independent infantry brigades
- 2 mountain brigades
- 1 airborne battalion
- 12 artillery, 6 anti-tank regiments
- 12 anti-aircraft artillery regiments

* The Navy has an additional 25 coastal artillery batteries.

It is estimated that the Para-Military Forces and Reserves number 1,516,000 of which 1,000,000 are assigned to the TDF.¹³

These forces are equipped with old U.S. and Soviet weapons as well as domestically produced armament (Fig. 7). The majority of armor and artillery pieces are supplied through the Soviet Union. Except for the domestically produced M980 mechanized infantry combat vehicle, the Yugoslavs depend on the M60, an older indigenously produced personnel carrier. Realizing the Warsaw Pact armies rely on mobility, speed, the desire to remain mounted when possible, the lack of a good mobile defense force is a weakness of the APD.

The artillery pieces are foreign-produced and are not self-propelled. Without mobility, it will be difficult for the artillery to support an active defense and keep ahead of the fast advancing WP armies. To augment the artillery the Yugoslavs have developed a towed multiple rocket launcher (MRL) but again mobility is poor. (Self-propelled artillery pieces and MRLs would create difficulties for guerrilla warfare conducted in the mountain strongholds.)

Country of Origin Weapon System/Equipment	Domestic	Soviet/East Europe	United States/West
Medium tanks	New tank under development ?T62/85	60 T62 530 T54 225 T55 250 T34/85	60 M47 Patton ¹ 400 M4 Sherman ¹
Light tanks		? PT76	
Armored personnel carriers	200 M980 MICVs 300 M60 ²	BTR60 BTR152	20 M8 100 M3 ³
Commando armored vehicles		BTR50PU	
Reconnaissance cars		BTR40PB/BRDM2	
Battlefield support rockets		40 Frog-7 (Luna)	
Surface-to-surface missiles		SSC2C Samlet ⁴	
Multiple-rocket launchers	YMRL32 (32x128) Oganj ⁵ M63 (32x128) Plamen ⁶ ? 1-barrel ⁷		
Guns	76mm M48 B1A1/B1A2	100mm M1955 130mm M46 155mm M2 76mm SU76 SP (M18)	
Coastal guns		122mm M37	88mm Flak-36 ⁸ 150mm LFH18 ⁸
Gun/howitzers		152mm M55 (D20) 152mm M37 ⁴	
Howitzers	105mm M56 ⁹ 155mm M63	122mm M38 122mm D30 130mm M54 ⁴	105mm M7B2
Surface-to-air missiles		SA6 Gaintul SA9 Gaskin	
Man-portable surface-to-air missiles		SA7 Grail (Strela)	
Antiaircraft guns	20mm M55 (single and triple) ¹⁰ 20mm M57 ¹¹	23mm ZSU23-4 SP Shilka 30mm M53/59 SP ¹² 37mm M38/39 57mm M50 57mm SU57-2 SP (S68) 85mm M44 ⁴	40mm L/60 Bofors 88mm Flak-36 ⁴ 12.7mm M55
Antitank guided missiles	AT3 Sagger New ATGM under development	AT1 Snapper	
Antitank guns	76mm M48B1	57mm M43 (ZIS-2) ¹ 57mm ASU57 SP ¹³ 76mm SU76 SP 85mm ASU85 SP ¹³ 100mm SU100 SP ¹⁴ 100mm T12	75mm PAK40 ⁸ 76mm M18 Hellcat 90mm M36 Jackson SP 105mm M7B2

Notes 1 Kept in reserve units

2 To be replaced with the M980 MICV

3 Probably not in service

4 In coastal artillery

5 Publicly revealed in 1975. Mounted on a chassis modeled after the Czech BM21 (Tatra 813)

6 Modeled after the Czech RM130

7 Revealed in 1977. Commando type. For armament of territorial defense and airborne units

8 Ex-German

9 Ex-US M101A1 and German M18/40

10 Produced under Swiss license. Hispano-Suiza antiaircraft gun HSS601 and HSS630 3 towed carriage

11 Swiss license. Hispano-Suiza HSS804 gun and HSS603 carriage

12 Czech. Mounted on Praga 6x6 V3S truck. M53 has open mounting. M59 partially enclosed mounting

13 Air droppable

14 Modified T34/85 chassis

Abbreviations ATGM = Antitank guided missile

MICV = Mechanized infantry combat vehicle

SP = Self-propelled

Sources Jane's Infantry Weapons, 1978. Franklin Watts Inc. N.Y. 1978

Jane's Weapon Systems, 1978. Franklin Watts Inc. N.Y. 1977

Soldat und Technik, 1978

Front (Belgrade)

Narodna Armija (Belgrade)

Figure 7. Yugoslav Ground Forces:
Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E)

Cited by Vego, "Yugoslav Ground Forces," p. 24.

The APD, with their outdated anti-tank weaponry, will have to confront a massive mechanized force. Except for wireguided Soviet AT-1 Snapper and AT-3 Sagger (ATGM) missiles, the APD must rely on AT guns. Not only is effectiveness questionable but survivability as well when these weapons confront modern T-72 tanks. Range and effectiveness of the line-of-sight ATGM will also be diminished when positioned in rolling, mountainous terrain. In contrast to the towed artillery, much of the AT weaponry is self-propelled. Deployment of these weapons in the mountain areas will also pose a problem for the APD.

To meet the massive air assault the APD will rely on self-propelled SA-6s and SA-9s when the attack is in the plains. But when the combat operations move to the mountains the APD will depend on the SA-7, a questionable weapon against modern aircraft.

Another problem to be faced by the APD is electronic warfare (EW). Each Soviet tactical air army has several organic support squadrons with aircraft equipped to conduct EW missions. These units can conduct electronic reconnaissance missions and electronic countermeasures (ECM) which includes jamming against radar (required for SA-6s), electronic guidance, and communications.¹⁴

The Yugoslavs are aware of their shortcomings and have attempted to compensate by developing a defense plan for survivability. Obviously the YPA alone, inadequate and

dysfunctional, could not survive against the overwhelming strength of the WP armies. Yet, the TDF alone, would forfeit the agricultural plains and the cities.¹⁵ (In 1981 the cities are far more important to Yugoslavia than they were in World War II when 75 percent of the country was rural.) The best properties of both the YPA and the TDF were brought together. A descending transformation from conventional warfare to guerrilla warfare is required. The YPA, with TDF reserves, and excellent intelligence to pinpoint the avenues of approach, must delay the attack long enough for the APD to mobilize.¹⁶ Ideally, the APD will force a long and protracted war by:

1. Extending and fragmenting the enemy's supplies and forces;
2. Restricting use of armor and mechanized infantry; and,
3. Destroying the morale of the enemy soldier.¹⁷

This citizen defense concept requires active and passive resistance. Noncooperation and noncompliance, work slowdowns, sabotage, resupply of food and clothing, and medical assistance are a few of the nonmilitary ways the citizen assists in the defense effort. Successful partisan warfare will allow the APD to survive and wear down the invader. After a period of time, the SFRY envisions the ability to make an ascending transformation to conventional warfare and to expel the enemy.

The necessity to conduct joint YPA and TDF operations, to conduct independent and isolated TDF operations under a heavy EW environment places great burdens on the command and control

of the APD. The command and control of the APD is not comparable to western systems. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Sava Stepanovitch states, "It incorporates political, ethnic and sociological, as well as military motives and objectives."¹⁸ This is illustrated by the composition of the APD in which the TDF and YPA are coequals under the General Staff and where the disposition of the YPA corresponds closely to the territory of the constituent republics as well.

Recently, changes have been made that give greater responsibility to the TDF. Some TDF units will be under operational control of the YPA tactical area commander and released from the TDF command during joint operations. Conversely, when a YPA unit is cut-off from the Supreme Command the highest element left of the republic TDF command will assume control. For example, if a joint TDF/YPA unit has been pushed from one republic to another and has lost communications with the General Staff, then the receiving republic's highest TDF element will assume control of the joint TDF/YPA force.¹⁹

Normally though, the TDF units are not subordinated to the YPA. Every socio-political unit has the obligation and responsibility to "organize total national defense and to command battle directly."²⁰ General Nikola Ljubicic, Yugoslav Minister of Defense, states, "The TDFs are the most massive part of the armed forces and are organized, armed, trained, and prepared for action on the entire territory of the country."²¹ Conceivably a Croat TDF unit may fight on Macedonian soil and fall under the command of the Macedonian TDF commander.

The APD claims a flexible, elastic system of command. Yet, since combat action varies in form, mode, and place, tightly coordinated command and control will be required or there could be any number of independent actions fought throughout the country. To compound these difficulties, the Yugoslavs recommend combat initiative not only by the TDF units but also by all fighters, indicating that every citizen will take action against the enemy.²² General Ljubicic recognizes these control problems but does not provide definitive answers.

Operations could not be conducted and would be unthinkable without the precise coordination of units of the various arms of the services within the framework of combined compositions, or without coordinations of units of armed services, achieved through uninterrupted command.²³

There are, in addition to the above problems, competing demands and requirements for commitment of TDF formations between various territorial-political units. Air defense, artillery, and workers battalions have multiple missions and must be provided priorities.

How will these potential command and control problems affect the various missions of the APD? The TDF alone has four missions:

1. To fight the enemy independently or in conjunction with the YPA;
2. To combat the enemy on temporarily occupied territory and engage in other forms of resistance;
3. To secure the population, territory, work and other organizations; and
4. To rescue life and property.²⁴

Can these be coordinated and controlled by the General Staff?

More importantly, beyond these major difficulties mentioned in this chapter lie the two critical variables of the Yugoslav All-People's Defense System:

- the collective will of the people within the context of political disunity, ethnic enmity, and regional rivalry;
- the economic ability of the defense system to provide arms, ammunition, food, and other equipment.

Does this system have credibility? Are the invaders, as well as the defenders, convinced that Yugoslavs are willing to risk their lives in defending the country at any cost? Cooperation and unity are necessary for the system to survive. Chapter three will examine the old internal rivalries that could affect the defense of Yugoslavia far more than old and obsolete weapons.

FOOTNOTES

¹F. B. Singleton, "The Post-Tito Era in Yugoslavia," Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 26 March 1980): 65.

²The Montreaux Convention places restrictions on type of vessel, numbers, and tonnage that can pass through the Bosphorus Strait. For a more detailed explanation see Jesse W. Lewis's The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington D.C., March 1976), p. 155.

³B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1970), p. 137.

⁴Former U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria, Mr. Raymond Garthoff, stated in an interview with the author that he felt Bulgaria would actively participate in the invasion of Yugoslavia. He also indicated that he felt Romanian assistance in such an invasion would be weak and possibly non-existent. Former Hungarian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Janos Radvanyi stated that Hungary would probably assist in an invasion of Yugoslavia.

⁵Axel Horager, "Yugoslavia's Defense: The Logic of Politics," Military Review 57 (June 1977): 62, and Graham H. Turbiville Jr., "Intervention in Yugoslavia: An Assessment of the Soviet Military Option," Strategic Review 5 (Winter 77): 68.

⁶Military Balance, 1979-1980 (International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1980), pp. 14-15.

⁷Soviet Army Operations (Department of the Army, April 1978), p. 2-8.

⁸It is very important to realize that the formation of a Front with seven armies creates a much more sizeable force than 40-45 divisions. Fire power and maneuverability (tactical air army, artillery division, multiple rocket launcher brigade, and combat service support equipment) are greatly increased.

⁹A. Ross Johnson, "Yugoslav Total National Defense," Military Review 53 (December 1973): 41, condensed from Survival (March-April 1973).

¹⁰For a detailed study of the Yugoslav Military see A. R. Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia," P-6070, RAND Study, 1978. Also see Robert W. Dean, "Civil-Military Relations in Yugoslavia, 1971-1975," Armed Forces and Society 3 (Fall 1976): 24.

¹¹"Territorial Defense of the SFRY," Yugoslav Survey 21 (February 1980): 54-55.

¹²Milan N. Vego, "Yugoslav Ground Forces: A Look at the Past and Present," Military Review 15 (November 1980): 22.

¹³Military Balance, p. 35.

¹⁴Soviet Army Operations, p. 5-83.

¹⁵Dennison I. Rusinow, "The Yugoslav Concept of All-National Defence," American Universities Field Staff Reports 19 (Hanover, New Hampshire, 1972): 2-3.

¹⁶The massing of 40-45 divisions, the movement of forces into Bulgaria across Romania or the Black Sea should provide some early warning to the Yugoslavs.

¹⁷"Total National Defence," Yugoslav Survey 16 (February 1975): 88.

¹⁸William E. Odom, "The Militarization of Soviet Society," Problems of Communism (Sep-Oct 1976): 47.

¹⁹Sava Stepanovitch, LTC., "Yugoslavia After Tito: Certain Uncertainty," Parameters 8 (June 1978): 87.

²⁰"Total National Defence," p. 86.

²¹Dean, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 69.

²²"Total National Defence," p. 95, and "Territorial Defense of the SFRY," p. 58.

²³"Territorial Defense of the SFRY," p. 58.

²⁴Nikola Ljubovic, "Total National Defense - Strategy of Peace," Socialist Thought and Practice 17 (Belgrade, 1977): 302.

²⁵"The Role of the Armed Forces in the System of National Defense," Yugoslav Survey 10 (November 1969): 29.

III. A SHOTGUN MARRIAGE: NATIONAL TENSIONS PERSIST

Ethnicity has been the plague of Eastern Europe, especially in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is inhabited by several nations, the South Slavs, and several nationalities whose parent nations are outside Yugoslavia (Table 1). How well these 'nations' and 'nationalities' will fight together as a united and cooperating force is a major concern to those evaluating the Yugoslav All-People's Defense (APD) system.

Following World War I and the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the South Slavs, except for the Bulgars, were united within a political nation-state for the first time in their history. The Declaration of Corfu, 20 July 1917, asserted the determination of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to unite under the principle of national self-determination. The Treaty of Versailles united the South Slavs under a Kingdom. It was not a 'melting pot' but rather a 'salad bowl' of sharply contrasting ingredients. This shotgun marriage united the Slovenes and Croats - basically Roman Catholic and of a Western European character - having been greatly influenced by Charlemagne's Empire and subsequent rule by the Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Italians with the Serbs, and Montenegrins, who are Eastern Orthodox and reflect the influence of the Ottoman Empire.

TABLE I — DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION BY NATIONALITY OR ETHNIC GROUPS BY REPUBLICS AND PROVINCES,
MARCH 31, 1971

	Yugo- slavia	Bosnia- -Herze- govina	Croatia	Mace- donia	Monte- negro	Total	Serbia proper	Kosovo	Vojvo- dina	Slovenia
TOTAL	20,522,972	3,746,111	4,426,221	1,647,308	529,604	8,446,591	5,250,365	1,242,693	1,952,533	1,727,137
RESPONDENTS WHO STATED THEIR NATIONALITIES										
Croats	4,526,782	772,491	3,513,647	3,882	9,192	184,913	38,088	8,264	138,561	42,657
Macedonians	1,194,784	1,773	5,625	1,142,375	723	42,675	25,100	1,048	16,527	1,613
Montenegrians	508,843	13,021	9,706	3,246	355,632	125,260	57,289	31,555	36,416	1,978
Moslems	1,729,932	1,482,430	18,457	1,248	70,236	154,330	124,482	26,357	3,491	3,231
Serbs	8,143,246	1,393,148	626,789	40,465	39,512	6,016,811	4,699,415	228,264	1,089,132	20,521
Slovenes	1,678,032	4,053	32,497	838	658	15,957	10,926	392	4,639	1,624,029
Albanians	1,309,523	3,764	4,175	279,871	35,671	984,761	65,507	916,168	3,086	1,281
Bulgarians	58,067	284	676	3,334	394	53,800	49,791	264	3,745	139
Czechs	24,620	871	19,001	80	74	4,149	1,341	37	2,771	445
Hungarians	477,374	1,262	35,488	229	296	430,314	6,279	169	423,866	9,785
Italians	21,791	673	17,433	48	70	566	330	25	211	3,001
Rumanians	58,570	189	792	105	22	57,419	4,412	20	52,987	43
Ruthenians	24,640	141	3,728	59	38	20,608	452	47	20,109	66
Slovaks	83,656	279	6,482	46	31	76,733	3,912	26	72,795	85
Turks	127,920	477	221	108,552	397	18,220	5,735	12,244	241	53
Austrians	852	44	352	9	5	164	118	8	38	278
Germans	12,785	300	2,791	77	109	9,086	1,825	18	7,243	422
Greeks	1,564	48	93	536	23	840	529	15	296	24
Jews	4,811	708	2,845	32	26	1,128	603	12	513	72
Poles	3,033	757	819	72	18	1,173	453	16	704	194
Romany-Gypsies	78,485	1,456	1,257	24,505	396	49,894	27,541	14,593	7,760	977
Russians	7,427	507	1,240	516	116	4,746	2,494	174	2,082	302
Ukrainians	13,972	5,333	2,793	50	10	5,643	633	4	5,006	143
Wallachians	21,990	52	13	7,190	6	14,724	14,653	5	66	5
Others	21,722	174	759	16,702	96	3,684	1,968	1,017	699	307
RESPONDENT WHO DID NOT STATE THEIR NATIONALITY										
Did not make any statement*	32,774	8,482	15,798	414	521	4,496	3,284	177	1,025	3,073
Declared themselves as "Yugoslavs"	273,077	43,796	84,118	3,652	10,943	123,824	75,976	920	46,928	6,744
Stated in sense of regional origin	15,002	—	—	684	1,204	10,409	4,895	259	5,255	2,705
UNKNOWN	67,138	9,598	18,626	2,491	3,185	30,274	22,338	1,595	6,341	2,964

* According to Article 41 of the Federal Constitution.

SOURCE: "National Structure of the Yugoslav Population,"
Yugoslav Survey 14 (February 1973): 3.

Difficulties arose immediately when the Croats felt they were being forced to assimilate into a "Greater Serbia." Personalities of these Slav nations contributed to ethnic rivalry and lack of cooperation. (Tito was to mention later that the Treaty of Versailles created a Yugoslavia with an inherent oppression; the South Slavs were divided by ethnic backgrounds with the Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrins considered unequal. Those groups in Macedonia and Kosovo were considered enslaved; while the minority elements of Moslems, Germans, and Hungarians were used as pawns in the struggles between the South Slavs.)¹

National self-determination was to guarantee religious freedom, and a measure of autonomy. Yugoslavia, henceforth, became one government but with two alphabets, three major religions (Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Muslim), four major languages (Slovene, Serbo-Croat, Albanian, and Macedonian), five nations (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins), and six republics (the aforementioned five nations plus Bosnia-Herzegovina). (Figure 8).

Difficulties in implementing the intent of the Declaration of Corfu arose quickly. On 28 November 1920, the Croatian delegates to the Constituent Assembly proposed a scheme which would leave a large measure of autonomy to the provincial governments but this was voted down. The highly centralized government which resulted deprived the Croats and Slovenes of their desired autonomy.




Figure 8. Map of Yugoslavia with the Six Republics and Two Autonomous Regions.

The Croat Peasant Party refused to cooperate in government and boycotted Parliament until 1924. This enabled the Serbs to dominate government stressing Serbian nationalism while opposing federalism and autonomy. A party system subsequently developed that was based on sectional loyalties. Turbulence and instability prevailed during the 1920s.

The breach was complete when, in the midst of a Parliamentary debate, three Croat Peasant Party leaders were assassinated. The Croats and their allies promptly withdrew from Parliament; the Kingdom faced collapse.

King Alexander, fearing the dissolution of the Kingdom, assumed full power, abolished the 1921 Constitution and established a royal dictatorship. He demonstrated his new powers by decreeing an end to freedom of the press, speech, and person. The king banned all parties that were "tribal" (Serbian, Croatian) or religious in nature. In a further attempt to submerge the national rivalries he substituted the name "Yugoslavia" (South Slav) for the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. He divided the new kingdom into nine banovines (governments) that deliberately violated the principle of provincial autonomy (Fig. 9).

King Alexander was assassinated in 1934. His cousin, Prince Paul Karageorgevic, headed a three-man regency which was to rule in the name of Alexander's son, King Peter II. Internal difficulties continued to mar the government of Yugoslavia.



Figure 9. The Banovine in Yugoslavia, 1931

—SOURCE: Milan Senoa, Geografski Atlas (Zagreb, 1934), pp. 18-19. The 1939 "compromise" with the enlarged Croatian unit is indicated. Cited by Jack C. Fisher, Yugoslavia--A Multinational State, (Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco, 1966), p. 22.

In 1939, Prince Paul appointed a leader of the Serbian Radicals as Premier. In order to prevent further growth of the Croat Ustasha, a right-wing nationalist, fascist organization, the Premier was tasked to reach an agreement with the Croats that would temporarily satisfy their desires for autonomy. The banovines of Sava and Primorje and parts of Bosnia were combined into the new banovine of Croatia, with its own parliament. The Serbs responded with a demand for a Serbian banovine. As World War II approached, Yugoslavia, with difficulties between Croats and Serbs still unreconciled and with extremists on the right (Ustasha) and left (Communists), waited with bated breath.

On 6 April 1941, without a declaration of war, the German Air Force attacked Belgrade. On 17 April 1941 the Yugoslav Army surrendered. By the end of 1941, Yugoslavia had been dismembered, partitioned, and occupied by the Axis Powers (Fig. 10).

Domestic separatists and pro-fascist forces assisted the occupiers in establishing quisling regimes (the Ustasha "Independent State of Croatia," "Independent Montenegro," a "commissioner" government in Serbia, the "consulta" in the district of Ljubljana, and so on). Repressive measures to include mass deportation, internment, forcible conversion, and liquidation were prevalent throughout, but nowhere worse than in Croatia. The Yugoslav government, exiled in London, estimated that approximately 600,000 Serbs were murdered by



Figure 10. The Dismemberment of Yugoslavia, 1942.

SOURCE: Ljudske i materijalne zrtve Jugoslavije u ratnom naporu 1941-1945 (Belgrade, 1945), p. 13, cited by Fisher, p. 23. An independent Croatian state was created. Germany annexed two-thirds of Slovenia while Italy took the rest of Slovenia and the Adriatic coastal area. Montenegro (Crna Gora) was made a separate kingdom, which was in personal union with the Italian king; Italian Albania obtained Kosovo-Methohija and part of Macedonia; the remainder went to Bulgaria. Hungary received parts of Slovenia and Croatia and part of Vojvodina (Backa and Baranja). Serbia became a separate unit administered by the Germans.

the Croat Ustasha in their attempt to exterminate the Serb community of Lika, Croatia. Other internecine conflicts were soon to follow.

Three large factions arose in the aftermath of the Axis invasion: Ustasha, Chetnik, and Partisan. Each perceived the threat or opportunity differently. The Ustasha were Croat nationalists that saw an opportunity for independence and autonomy.

The Serb Chetniks saw the Communist Partisans as a greater threat than the Germans. If the Partisans were to succeed, the Chetniks feared Yugoslavia ruled by a Serbian King would cease to exist.

The Partisans saw the invasion as an opportunity to create a people's revolution. A rallying cause - German occupation of the homeland - was present. Coupled with recognition by the Allies, a growing division within the Chetnik ranks created a situation that the Partisans were able to capitalize on.

Yugoslavia was a troubled land. Not only were the Axis Powers occupying it but the Yugoslavs were involved in a civil war. By the end of the Second World War, casualties caused by Yugoslav killing Yugoslav, would surpass the casualties inflicted by the Axis Powers. Of the total 1,750,000 casualties, 1 million were killed by Yugoslavs.³

Nevertheless, Yugoslavia survived. Today the Yugoslavs revel in recounting the success of the Partisans against the

Axis Powers. Support for the All-People's Defense (APD) system stems from this period. The defense of Yugoslavia today, however, may not be as successful as it was against the Axis Powers.

Yugoslavia cannot expect the Warsaw Pact (WP) armies to give the invasion and occupation the same priority that the Germans did. Germany had commitments on two major fronts and was fighting for its own survival. The German units, manned by over-age soldiers, attempted to occupy Yugoslavia with outdated equipment and armament. German combat leaders felt they could have defeated the guerrillas if they had been provided abundant supplies and well-trained men. Sophisticated treatment of the population, isolation of guerrillas from support bases, and careful development of political and military strategy could have capitalized on the internal divisions of Yugoslavia.⁴ As for German allies, it was suggested that the Italian troops and the Croatian Waffen SS were handicaps, not assets. (The Partisans broke out from two different encirclements through the Croatian ranks.)

Jozo Tomasevich, in War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, defines victory in partisan terms as "surviving and not being incapacitated for further action."⁵ By this definition, Tito and the Partisans were successful even after suffering 35 percent losses in breaking out of the Axis encirclement, the Fifth Offensive (Operation Schwarz).

As the German nation neared defeat, Tito was able to maneuver the Communists into positions of power in the forthcoming Yugoslav government. Ethnic tensions, so destructive in Yugoslav history, went into remission, as the Yugoslavs attempted to rebuild their nation.

Realizing that ethnic differences and nationalism have thwarted all efforts to create a federal union of South Slavs, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) permitted degrees of control and power to be shifted to the republics. Compromises were made, mostly through decentralization of government, economy, and military, in an effort to keep all republics within the fold. "However, in the 1960's," as A. Ross Johnson asserts, "it became evident to the Yugoslav League of Communists (LCY) that they had not solved the ethnic problem but had only anesthetized it."⁶

The years 1962-6 witnessed a great economic debate encompassing political issues as well. Sir Duncan Wilson, in Tito's Yugoslavia, said that Tito criticized the "excessive large wage differentials, excessive waste of funds in overseas travel by management, too many new cars for management, and even the selling of Yugoslav industrial secrets" and suggested that firm measures must be taken.⁷ Tito wavered between centralism and more economic planning at the local level.

Investment became the crucial problem, political as well as economical, for the Yugoslav planners. Republican national feelings revived as the more and less developed regions discussed economic development and control of investment.

By 1964 Tito firmly favored economic reform. Too much money was being spent by the government and not enough capital investment by the republics. Excessive demand for consumer goods and investment funds continued; the rate of inflation and the balance of payments deficit continued to rise.

The market system was introduced by the Economic Reform of 1965 and, as Dusko Doder states, "It shifted decision making powers to republics and individual enterprises."⁸ This made the success or failure of the enterprise the responsibility of the worker and not the state.

For the economic reform to work it was necessary for the Party to cooperate. If necessary, changes within the Party would be made. Alexander Rankovic, Vice-President of Yugoslavia, responsible for organization of the LCY, and the secret police (UDBA), was the most important "head to roll." The UDBA was charged with acting in the interests of Serb nationalism and thwarting the Reform program.

Economic reform led to political reform. A. Ross Johnson asserts that the "decentralization created power bases away from the central party."⁹ Power created a drive for more power. Comparatively free discussion on issues from economics to politics surfaced.

The Croats took the challenge to the government most vigorously but they were not alone in the attempt to improve their economic and political position. Slovenes, Macedonians, and Bosnians had special grievances of their own.¹⁰

Language became a nationalist crisis in 1967. On 17 March 1967, Zagreb's leading literary weekly called for complete official and constitutional recognition of two separate languages. The Serbs immediately made countermands; the Lika Serbs, a commune of Serbs in Croatia, should be permitted to use Cyrillic and to be educated in their own language.¹¹ The leaders of the LCY reacted strongly against both sides.

In 1968, the year of "student power" all over the world, the students of Yugoslavia proclaimed that the professed ideology was nonfulfilling and created a stagnant social structure - no upward mobility for students. Value expectations exceeded value capabilities and the students blamed the government for their inability to reach their objectives.¹²

It became easy for the Croats to feel the Serbs were responsible for their relative deprivation. Ever since the war, the Serbs had dominated the high positions in government and the military. Belgrade, the nation's capital, the Croats felt, did not serve as a representative capital of the South Slavs but as the Serb capital. The Croats feared that their funds were being expropriated by the Belgrade (read Serb) bureaucracy, Belgrade banks, and Belgrade-based foreign trade enterprises. Belgrade was held responsible for all that was outdated, centralist, and authoritarian.¹³ It became acceptable to blame difficulties on the Serb centralists. Students demonstrated against a perceived stagnant social structure, a low standard of living, and no upward mobility.¹⁴

An elitist movement emerged in Croatia which seized upon the unresolved economic, political and cultural problems and defined them in nationalist terms. Disturbances erupted in 1971 and continued unabated into 1972.

Early in November, 1971, the final text of the proposals put forward by Matica Hrvatska (Croatian Queen Bee), a Croat cultural organization, were published throughout Croatia. Duncan Wilson states that the proposals "amounted to something dangerously close to a declaration of independence."¹⁵ The proposals sought the right to self-determination to include the right to secede from the Federation; full control of republic revenues with "voluntary contributions" to the Federation; development of a separate Croat monetary policy with its own bank of issue; autonomy for its TDF; and, stationing of all YPA recruits in Croatia. When these proposals were discussed in student meetings more radical actions were contemplated - revision of Croatian frontiers, formal federalization of the army, and separate Croat membership in the U.N.¹⁶

The situation was intolerable. Tito took action to remove the nationalist deviants from the highest levels of Croatian leadership in 1971. The prominent intellectual and student leaders, accused of national separatism and other subversive or oppositional political acts, were arrested and tried.¹⁷

Tito took this opportunity to rebuild the LCY and to tighten discipline within the LCY. In an effort to demonstrate to all republics that Serbia did not govern Yugoslavia,

a series of amendments were passed that limited the federal government to defense, foreign policy, economic control and planning, and the enactment and supervision of law.

Like Croatia, Serbia witnessed dissatisfaction with the policies of the regime and late in 1972 a political crisis erupted within the Serbian League of Communists. In mid-October, Tito described the situation as "unhealthy" and criticized the leadership of factionalism, liberalism toward class enemies, the preoccupation with local interests.¹⁸ Tito accepted the resignations of the Serbian party chairman and secretary; he replaced them with loyal Titoists.

The dissidents were not eradicated however. Conducted mostly outside Yugoslavia by emigres, the Croat nationalist movement continued throughout the 1970s. Yugoslav Internal Security forces, constantly on the alert for pro-Soviet, Anti-Tito activity, arrested, over a two-year period from 1974-76, an estimated 200 Cominformists, Croatian nationalists, and Albanian separatists.¹⁹

When questioned about nationalist problems and difficulties, Stane Dolanc, once considered heir-apparent to Tito, remarked in an interview, 26 January 1981,

I think we often wrongly interpret certain stages of our development. I would not say that any cooling in the relations between peoples and nationalities has occurred in our country. I think we have had certain problems and difficulties and that we will have them in the future.²⁰

The problems and difficulties Dolanc feared erupted in the Albanian-speaking province of Kosovo, March and April,

1981. What began as a student protest concerning poor campus conditions on 11 March 1981, now has the makings of a full-blown nationalist protest.

The Albanians of Kosovo are the fifth largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia. The province has a greater population than Macedonia and Montenegro yet still remains a province within Serbia. Some overtly nationalist slogans called for recognition as a full-fledge republic while others called for union with Albania, creating a "Greater Albania" incorporating the Albanian peoples of neighboring Macedonia and Montenegro.²¹

How would the Serbs react to the loss of Kosovo? In the past the Serbs have merely observed the "Albanisation" of Kosovo, but it is unlikely that they will acquiesce in upgrading Kosovo to full republic status. Serb latent nationalist passions would surely reawaken. The Serbs feel they have lost the most in the present-day Yugoslavia. Decentralization of the government and the military has come at the expense of the Serbs. Each little change is perceived as a weakening of the Serb position. The loss of Kosovo implies the loss of the Serbian national shrine, the battlefield at Kosovo Pole, just outside Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, where the Serbs were defeated, and subsequently dominated for centuries, by the Turks and would serve as another wound to Serb national pride.

The risk is high, as Anthony Robinson, correspondent for Financial Times suggests, because if Kosovo is recognized as a Republic, the Constitution permits secession from the Federation (However this would be very unlikely.).²² The loss of Kosovo would almost certainly affect the delicate balance in Yugoslavia. Not only would Serbia lose a province but, in the extreme, Yugoslavia could lose a republic. Would the Constitution be upheld?

Can the Yugoslav APD system expect these primordial tensions to dissipate in time of national crisis? The question of cooperation and unity arises.

The APD command and control element must make all of these diverse nations and nationalities perform together. The wide latitude given to individuals and small units to conduct military operations indicates a potential for many independent combat actions rather than a coordinated defensive effort. The ethnic differences and strong nationalistic feelings do raise questions about the APD. What will the response be when a Serb unit is directed by the General Staff to reinforce a Croat unit, or a Kosovo unit? Will they respond as fast as the Russians did to the cry for help from the Yugoslavs in World War II? As already indicated, the highest TDF commander in the territory is in command of all units within his territory when communications with the General Staff is lost. Will a Croat or Serb unit submit to orders given to them by a Bosnian Muslim TDF commander? Can a Catholic Croat expect

logistical support, medicine and food, from a Serb? Will the entire APD break down - defense of hearth and home taking priority over a united stand against the enemy? Will the invader be seen as the enemy or the savior?

Will Croatia move toward separatism, as it did in WWII, or will it fight to defend Yugoslavia? Will Kosovo use war as leverage for their demands? Have the enmities between Serbs and Croats cooled enough to permit cooperation and unity? Will an invader be able to aggravate these hatreds by promising autonomy to the nations as the Axis Powers did? Are the irridentist feelings within the nationalities strong enough to capitalize on?

These questions are difficult to answer. It has been difficult for Yugoslavia to preserve itself as a nation-state when it has needed to demonstrate federalizing tendencies to keep peace with the republics and provinces. Matters of language, education, control of the TDF, and the economy have been causes for difficulty and concern. Nevertheless, they are problem areas that the leaders of Yugoslavia must face. Few authorities question the combat ability of the South Slav. What is questioned is the ability to cast aside the historical hatreds and to face the invader as one country united within the concept of All-People's Defense.

FOOTNOTES

¹Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms (Praeger, New York, 1976), p. 130.

²John A. Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe (American Book Company, New York, 1953), p. 383.

³F. B. Singleton, "The Post-Tito Era in Yugoslavia," Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 26 March 1980): 65.

⁴Paul N. Heln, The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II. German Counter-Insurgency in Yugoslavia 1941-1943 (East European Quarterly, Boulder, 1979), p. 144.

⁵Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, The Chetniks (Stanford University Press, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1975), p. 254.

⁶A. Ross Johson, Yugoslavia in the Twilight of Tito (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1974), p. 16.

⁷Duncan Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979), p. 139.

⁸Dusko Doder, The Yugoslavs (Random House, Inc., New York, 1978), p. 99.

⁹Johnson, Twilight, p. 9.

¹⁰The Slovenes sought to improve their economic position through trade links with Austria and West Germany--those links taking priority over inter-Republican relations. The macedonians and Bosnians were promised self-determination during the war. They perceived a great dichotomy between de jure self-determination and de facto self-determination. There is also the dispute with Bulgaria over Macedonia; it has waxed and waned, often not heard until the Soviets determine it time to place some pressure on the Yugoslavs.

¹¹Dennison I. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977), p. 225.

¹²William E. Griffith, "Eastern Europe after the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," P-3983 RAND Corp, 9 October 1968, p. 43, 75.

¹³Rusinow, Experiment, p. 249.

¹⁴Griffith, "Eastern Europe," p. 43.

¹⁵Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia, p. 205.

¹⁶Ibid., 206.

¹⁷Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 36.

¹⁸Roberts, Nations in Arms, p. 132.

¹⁹Dan Morgan, "Croatian Terrorists: Heirs of a Long-Time Separatist Movement," Washington Post, 12 Sep 76, p. A-15-5, mentions the assassinations and attempted assassinations by Croatian emigres from 1971-75. Washington Post, 14 Jan 75, p. A-11-5, reported 100 persons arrested in Pristina--Albanian separatists demonstrating for a "Greater Albania."

²⁰"Dolanc Discusses Presidency, Nationalities," Belgrade NIN, 18 Jan 81, pp. 8-12, in FBIS-EEU, 28 Jan 81, p. I-24.

²¹Financial Times (London), 7 April 1981, p. 2.

²²Ibid.

IV. THE ALL-PEOPLE'S DEFENSE SYSTEM: A MIRROR OF YUGOSLAVIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The National Defense Act of 1969 reduced the size of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and created the Territorial Defense Force (TDF). This change in method of defense saw a reduction in federal revenues allocated toward defense from 22 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 6.2 percent. The All-People's Defense (APD), however, still placed a great economic burden on the peoples of Yugoslavia. True, the federal outlay toward defense had been reduced but the law contained certain stated and implied demands on the economy such as the responsibility of the republics and autonomous regions to organize, train, and equip the TDF, to include supply, transportation, medical and veterinary care.¹ This chapter will touch upon the regional economic disparity and suggest a few defense factors that may be influenced adversely by that disparity. Before an examination of the regional economic disparities is made however, a discussion of these factors is in order.

As shown by the Yugoslav People's Army Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), chapter two, the YPA functions with outdated equipment. If the YPA, the main defensive arm of Yugoslavia, has not been able to modernize because of the decrease in defense revenues, it is highly possible that the

TDF also lacks modern equipment.² The situation further suggests that the TDF would be further behind in its modernization efforts, definitely not equal to the YPA, and therefore the ability of the TDF to conduct joint operations with the YPA would be adversely affected.

Another factor includes manpower and training. Before the Defense Act, the republics had little direct responsibility to the YPA other than responding to military conscription and taxes. Now, however, the TDF, with a projected strength of three million, not only draws from the youth that would serve in the YPA but funds for recruiting and training the TDF creates an additional financial burden on the republic and communes.³ Proper training, especially in joint operations requires time and equipment. Each republic must be able to equip a portion of the TDF, from sections through brigades, and to allocate training time for joint and separate exercises.

An implied area of concern is that of transportation and the required infrastructure. Speed, flexibility of operations, and resupply are greatly enhanced by a good transportation network. Yugoslavia, however, does not have a good road or rail network. The more developed areas of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia proper have the best roads but the main network which passes across the northern plain from east to west would soon be lost in time of war.

The supply of rations and other foodstuffs is another economic factor that the republics are required to provide. The Pannonian plain and the Morava and Vardar valleys are major agricultural areas in Yugoslavia. Again, these areas should be priority objectives of the invading armies and thus lost early to the Yugoslavs. Can the other regions provide food to the APD during time of war?

The compatibility of weapons systems between TDFs is another concern. Do the various TDF units have like TO&E? Are weapons systems interchangeable? Are republic commands capable of providing aid and assistance to other units if they assume operational control of them? Can the regions provide the revenue required to upgrade and modernize the TDF so it can join the YPA in combat or fight independently in a partisan role?

The problem facing the government of Yugoslavia is two-fold. First, modernization of the TDF is necessary to ensure operational harmony with the YPA, but may strain an already weakened economy. Second, modernization, or the lack of it, may create social and political problems which will cause a rupture in the fragile social and economic system that would be as dangerous as the risk of military attack and bring about the downfall of Yugoslavia.

In supporting the APD, each community must raise revenue to finance the YPA, TDF, and Civil Defense (CD) elements within their jurisdiction. The APD system creates the familiar

"guns or butter" dilemma for Yugoslavia. The viability of the APD depends on the ability of a region to cope with its economic problems and the "crisis-prone" nationalist quarrels and the willingness to subordinate the local interest to national defense.

As previously stated, the defense of Yugoslavia would almost certainly be conducted from the mountainous regions. Except for stay-behind forces and isolated urban fighting, it is expected that the surviving YPA elements, along with the TDFs, would conduct their defense from the traditional mountain strongholds that have been used for centuries against invaders. That type action places a great burden on the regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and selected areas in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. Because of the expected invasion (Chap. 2), it is felt that the urban centers and major transportation networks will be lost quickly. If the defense is to be conducted in the local redoubts, the economic disparity between the developed regions and the less developed regions (LDR) creates concern over the quality of the APD found in those LDRs.

Weapons are stored in mobilization centers, for example, while ammunition and spare parts are cached in tactical locations throughout Yugoslavia.⁴ If a unit is forced to leave its area of operation it then loses access to those caches. The receiving TDF assumes operational control and thus logistical support of the incoming unit. Is a TDF of a LDR equipped to assume logistical support of another TDF?

The economic disparity between the northern regions and southern regions creates concern over the quality of TDF in the LDRs and their ability to support other TDFs especially when one considers that the defense will be conducted from the LDRs.

The disparities between these regions have worsened rather than improved over the past 30 years. A short discussion of how and why these regional disparities occurred is due. Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina were much closer to the industrial centers of Central Europe, and the economic and cultural influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire laid the foundation for modern development of the north. The less developed regions, under the influence of the Ottoman Empire, experienced a retarded development. This lag in economic development is also reflected in technical and managerial know-how differences. The northern regions do not want to subsidize the southern regions through capital or management.⁵

Problems in the social infrastructure as well as the economic and physical infrastructures developed. The deficiencies of the social infrastructure, which include quality and access to education and health facilities, housing, administration, cultural services, and facilities for health and education, led to a diversion of a large share of investment resources from productive investment.⁶ These deficiencies tend to "push" the most mobile and best educated from the deprived less developed regions to the urban centers, especially those in the more developed regions.

These urban centers tend to attract from the agrarian labor forces and, once activated, more labor from the agrarian community followed seeking better employment, higher wages, housing, and other factors associated with urban-industrial society. At the beginning it helped the industrialization but now those migrations have drained too much manpower from the agrarian sector.⁷

The economy of the less developed regions appears to be caught in a system that perpetuates the difficulties rather than solve them. They have tended to be preoccupied with the development of basic industries such as mining and manufacturing, electric power generation, pulp and paper products and basic chemicals. The more developed regions have placed greater emphasis on processing industries. Why? First, the physical availability of natural resources tended to indicate it was economically feasible to use them. Second, each region felt that it was only sound development strategy to begin by developing these raw materials and that this would lead to progress. Third, because of a lack of well-educated and experienced skilled manpower this choice of industrial development seemed logical because these industries require less skill per unit investment. Fourth, the development of these industries were seen to be less risky and easier. Fifth, access to relatively inexpensive credits tend to create a bias toward capital-intensive basic industries.⁸

Each region has been left to itself for development, financially assisted by the General Investment Fund and the Federal Fund. The self-management system whereby each republic, in fact each major industry, manages itself does not promote the transfer of investment resources, technical know-how, or entire activities to the LDRs. Workers are motivated by loyalty to their organization and to their community. Add to that the lack of profit-motive, and the LDRs are unlikely to receive volunteer assistance from the more developed regions. A change in this attitude may be forthcoming for on 16 January 1981 Croatia did state that they were interested in investing in the underdeveloped areas of other republics and the province of Kosovo.⁹ Kosovo, in the meantime, has reached agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland to develop Kosovo energy resources.¹⁰ Kosovo represents 30 percent of the country's total energy potential and the terms of the agreement obligates Kosovo to deliver electric power to those partners even when Yugoslavia suffers power shortages.

It is not that the government has not recognized this regional disparity; it has, but has been unable to remedy the situation. A government statement, 9 September 1980, indicated that they recognize the regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro as underdeveloped regions and Kosovo as distinctly underdeveloped. Slovenia, on the other hand, is well-developed, Croatia is relatively close, and Serbia is somewhere near these two.¹¹ (See Table 2).

TABLE 2.
INCOME PER CAPITA, BY REGION, 1954-75

Region	Gross Material Product per capita (Yugoslavia = 100)				Gross National per capita (dollars)	Household Income per capita (Yugoslavia=100)
	1954	1964	1970	1975	1975	1973
Less developed regions	71	65	61	69	924	72
Bosnia-Herzegovina	82	69	67	69	1,016	76
Kosovo	48	37	34	33	492	49
Macedonia	69	73	64	69	1,026	78
Montenegro	53	72	78	70	1,035	82
More developed regions	110	118	121	121	1,793	116
Croatia	119	119	125	124	1,840	125
Serbia	84	95	92	92	1,365	100
Slovenia	188	187	201	201	2,979	150
Vojvodina	88	116	110	121	1,790	105
Yugoslavia	100	100	10	100	1,480	100

SOURCE: Martin Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan, and Nawal A. Tatawy, Yugoslavia: Self-management Socialism and Challenges of Development, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1979): 287, table 11.1

The disparity is most evident in the income per capita ratio between Kosovo and Slovenia. It has fallen drastically from 1:3 in 1947 to 1:7 in 1975 to 1:10 in 1980.¹² In addition, the intraregional differences in income are considerable. There are areas within the LDRs that compare favorably with the developed regions and there are regions within the developed regions that compare with the LDRs. Given this great disparity,

can the All-People's Defense system, especially the Territorial Defense Forces from the less developed regions be expected to perform their mission at the operational army's front, at the rear, or in guerrilla-type operations on territory temporarily held by the enemy?

Within the regions, the greatest differences in income are between the urban and rural areas. With each commune held responsible for developing its TDF this factor is important because the urban elements will more likely than not, be forced into the rural areas to conduct their missions, leaving weapons and equipment, and relying upon the caches of the rural areas.

The disparities are a result of different growth rates of Gross Material Product (GMP) and population. The growth of GMP in the less developed regions was only slightly lower than that in the more developed regions but the higher rates of population growth diluted the benefits of economic growth (Table 3).

The widening disparity of GMP per capita and the imbalances of population growth between rich and poor regions add tension to the already present national and regional differences.¹³ Not only are the rural areas unlikely to be able to provide support to other elements of the APD but will harbor a degree of resentment; they hold the developed regions and the federal government responsible for their economic plight. In theory, the developed areas concentrate upon their own

development.¹⁴ Rather than assist in the development of the LDRs, the developed regions feel further development of their own regions will produce a carryover effect and assist the LDR in the long run. The developed regions argue that the LDRs are not progressing under the present system and are slowing the growth of the developing regions.

TABLE 3.
GROWTH OF GROSS MATERIAL PRODUCT, POPULATION, AND GROSS MATERIAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA, BY REGION, 1966-75

Region	Average annual rate of growth		
	Gross Material Product	Population	Gross material product per capita
Less developed regions	5.4	1.6	3.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	5.0	1.3	3.6
Kosovo	6.1	2.7	3.0
Macedonia	6.3	1.5	4.5
Montenegro	5.1	1.1	3.9
More developed regions	5.6	0.6	4.9
Croatia	5.3	0.5	4.8
Serbia	5.4	0.7	4.6
Slovenia	6.8	0.7	6.0
Vojvodina	5.0	0.4	4.6
Yugoslavia	5.6	1.0	4.5

SOURCE: Schrenk, Ardalan, Tatawy, 290, table 11.3. Gross Material Product is the value of material production and productive services produced by both the socialist and private sectors in manufacturing, mining, power, agriculture, forestry, construction, transportation and communications, and trade and catering; the productive part of crafts and public utilities sectors are also included. Services and activities regarded as nonproductive--notably public administration, defense, and educational and health activities--are excluded.

The 1984 Winter Olympics, to be conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, help illustrate the difficulty. Slovenia argues that the games should be held in Slovenia because facilities are present and adequate. The money saved by not constructing new facilities could be invested better. The local government of Bosnia-Herzegovina urges the development of the facilities, not only for the short-run return of tourist dollars, but for long term attraction to future tourists. The facilities at Sarajevo will be constructed through the taxes of other republics with no guarantee of investment return through tourism. Yet, if the federal government does not invest in Sarajevo, Slovenia will get richer and Bosnia-Herzegovina will gain little. Will the rich continue to get richer and the poor poorer? Fred B. Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, expressed the underlying impact best when he said, "regional differences in economic developments are reinforced by cultural, linguistic and religious differences between the Yugoslav peoples."¹⁵ These regional differences tend to be expressed in nationalist terms and add to the animosity discussed in chapter three. They exacerbate the ethnic tensions and create noncooperation and disunity which could affect the performance of the APD.

Southern Yugoslavia questions the concept of a united socialist Yugoslavia when confronted with the wide disparity of living standards and the decreasing natural resources, while

the northern republics fail to understand why they should subsidize the LDRs.¹⁶

As mentioned, there are intraregional disparities as well. Within each region there is a wide gulf in productivity and income between the traditional private agricultural sector and the modern social urban sector (Table 4). Average household income per capita in nonagriculture is about 90 percent of the national average in the less developed regions. Kosovo is the clear exception. In most regions the nonagriculture income per capita is 150 to 200 percent of that in agriculture.

TABLE 4.
HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER CAPITA, BY REGION, 1973
(ALL YUGOSLAVIA HOUSEHOLDS--100)

Region	Household Income per Capita			
	All house- holds	Agri- cultural house- holds	Mixed house- holds	Nonagri- cultural house- holds
Less developed regions	72	58	65	90
Bosnia-Herzegovina	76	61	67	100
Kosovo	49	39	48	61
Macedonia	78	66	73	88
Montenegro	82	58	78	94
More developed regions	116	78	104	140
Croatia	125	85	112	151
Serbia	100	69	86	128
Slovenia	150	106	135	166
Vojvodina	105	87	103	116
Yugoslavia	100	70	89	125

SOURCE: Schrenk, Ardalan, Tatawy, 294, table 11.7.

The greatest difficulties are found in the areas that have the highest population growth rate. Larger families tend to dilute the per capita income per family. This relative poverty has an impact on the willingness to sustain and equip a modern fighting force. With the move to the urban areas there has been an increased neglect of the agricultural areas; villages have been abandoned and the land has been untended.

In World War II over 75 percent of the Yugoslav population was considered rural. Today there are 4.2 million private farmers, or approximately 20 percent, cultivating 85 percent of the agricultural land. Before the war Yugoslavia was a net exporter of agricultural products. Today they import more than \$1 billion of agricultural produce (mostly food) while exporting only \$7 million. A symptom of the difficulty is reflected in market shortages in cooking oil, medicants, detergents, and coffee.¹⁷ This further illuminates a weakness to be faced by Yugoslavia during wartime; the soldier must be fed. The mountains and hills where the major part of the defense will be conducted do not provide the agricultural output as do the plains and valleys (those areas that will most likely be occupied by the invader).

When discussing some of the difficulties the Partisans faced in WW II with Sir Fitzroy Maclean, the British Liaison Officer, Marshal Tito said, "the economic position of the population of an area is of first-rate importance to our

troops. Unlike the enemy we have no stores of food or food processing factories in our rear."¹⁸ In peacetime Yugoslavia is not self-supporting in agriculture; wartime would place a great burden on the APD. If the TDF and YPA units are forced into another area of operation, will one unit share already short food supplies with a unit with language, cultural, or religious differences? In WW II, both occupying German and Italian forces as well as Partisan, Chetnik, and Ustasha forces raped the land and stole foodstuffs from the starving peasants.

The shift of population from rural to urban areas may also have an impact on the APD. The values of a rural farmer are quite possibly different from an urbanite. Dennison I. Rusinow, in The Yugoslav Experiment, suggests the formation of a new class division in Yugoslavia and that the traditional values have been irreparably breached.¹⁹ Has the Yugoslav warrior moved to the city? The urbanite looks forward to an eight-hour work day, higher income, and urban delights while the farmer faces labor from dusk to dawn, low wages, mud and boredom.

Changes in values are also reflected by the youth serving in the youth organizations of the YPA. There are reports that tours of duty are carried out by other men, for money, for cigarettes, or other forms of bribery. The more affluent are able to pay other men to replace them for unsavory jobs and duties. It appears that the bribery has penetrated the administration of the organizations. Assignments to duty

positions such as courier, clerk, or storage man and other soft jobs away from guard duty and other drudgeries have an effect on morale.²⁰

This urban migration not only has affected personal value systems but has increased the difficulties for the federal government. In the less developed areas there are insufficient jobs and housing, poor transportation systems, and inadequate services and utilities.²¹

The LDRs are far from the economic centers of Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana. The disadvantages are amplified by deficiencies in the interregional and intraregional systems for transport and communications. These deficiencies have forced the less developed regions to allocate a higher proportion of their investment resources to the development of this much needed transport and communications infrastructure. The mountainous topography of all the LDRs and the intraregional differences in population density tend to make the development of this infrastructure very costly.²² Further adding to this transportation problem, Yugoslavia, as a nation, has attempted to improve the old highway system rather than construct new ones.²³

Poor transportation networks have adverse effects on military operations. Speed, mobility, and operational flexibility are greatly reduced. The ability to conduct coordinated operations, envelopments, artillery support, reinforcement, withdrawals, resupply, and evacuation of wounded will be

affected. (Again, this deficiency is also concentrated in the LDRs where this author assumes the majority of the defensive effort will take place.)

The quality of roads differ greatly in individual regions. This is illustrated in a survey conducted by the Institute of Investment Economics in 1969 which stated that of all roads with improved surfaces 68 percent were poorly and 32 percent well designed. Of all well designed roads 49 percent had a good surface, 32 percent medium good, and 19 percent a low quality or worn-out surface. At the same time, of the 68 percent poorly designed roads, 13 percent had a good surface, 44 percent a medium good and 43 percent a low quality or worn-out surface.²⁴ The West-East roads (the main highway crosses Slovenia, Croatia and northern Serbia connecting the republic capitals) do not fully meet the requirements of modern transport, especially with regard to trunk routes. The main lateral lines (north-south) in the area bordered by the Una and Morava rivers, which flow through Zagreb, Croatia, and through Belgrade, Serbia, respectively, are not efficiently linked by longitudinal roads. These north-south roads border the less developed regions. The quality and capacity of access roads to trunk roads are unsatisfactory.²⁵ Airborne and airmobile operations by the invader will tend to circumvent this shortcoming. The Yugoslavs cannot intradict these transportation routes because they will be needed in the ascending transformation (counteroffensive).

Road construction and maintenance are primarily financed by republic and regional road funds--the LDRs have less to invest in road construction and maintenance. Road construction also receives money from road users (taxes and tolls). This is another case of the rich getting richer--poorly maintained roads do not attract travelers and therefore receive less revenue for construction and maintenance.

Another problem facing the federal government and the APD is arms manufacturing. Tito lamented that the Partisans had no factories for producing arms in WW II.²⁶ Yugoslavia, in line with its foreign policy of nonalignment, has attempted to meet its weapons requirements from within. Many of the smaller aircraft that support the TDF from unimproved airfields are made in Yugoslavia. Today it is estimated that Yugoslavia produces 80 percent of their weapons in Yugoslav factories. They are attempting to meet the demand for anti-tank and anti-air weapons from within as well.²⁷ The federal government simply does not want to place the defense of Yugoslavia in the hands of a fickle arms dealer that may not provide arms in time of need or that may attempt to influence their politics. On the other hand, if Yugoslavia produces a weapon system that is not compatible with one found on the international arms market, it will find it difficult to meet spare parts and ammunition requirements when their own industry is lost.

Some military leaders suggest that Yugoslavia depends too heavily on the domestic production of weapons and military equipment. Too heavily a reliance on its own manpower, technology, and material will affect the APD. It is possible that there are more jobs to be performed than there are people to perform them. Advanced technological demands for certain systems may force the federal government to look to a foreign supplier.²⁸

The military modernization effort has slowed recently. The economy cannot respond to the regional disparities and the APD simultaneously. Col. General Dane Cuic, Secretary of the Committee of the LCY organization in the YPA, reported on 22 October 1980, that the YPA would undergo cutbacks in food, clothing, accommodation and medical expenditures. Funds for training have also been reduced. The country's own production of weapons and military equipment is experiencing basically the same problems as all of Yugoslavia in the shortage of raw materials and producer goods.²⁹ This slowdown in modernization could affect combat readiness.

The Yugoslav economy suffers. The foreign debts total \$18 billion; unemployment stands at 13 percent--an intolerable level in a country that calls itself communist. The inflation rate is above 30 percent, and the economy is plagued by shortages.³⁰ December 1980 inflation was 51.2 percent higher than the year before and a further slowdown of the economy is expected.³¹

In the past, Yugoslavia was able to relieve the unemployment by permitting emigration to Western Europe. It has been estimated that the equivalent of 3 to 5 armies of Yugoslavs, approximately one million, were in Western Europe. Since the 1980 recession in Europe though, many of these guest workers have returned to Yugoslavia. This return increases unemployment, removes their income from the economic flow, and places an increased burden on the system.

As a stone sends ripples across a pond, so does the faltering economy send shock waves across all facets of Yugoslav life. Regional disparities increase; transportation networks are not improved; urban social unrest increases; and modernization of the APD reaches a standstill. All of these factors tend to place the credibility of the All-People's Defense system, one that is intended to deter any potential invader, in question.

FOOTNOTES

¹"Territorial Defense of the SFRY," Yugoslav Survey 21 (February 1980): 55.

²Jane's Infantry Weapons, 1978, and Jane's Weapons Systems, 1978, (Franklin Watts, Inc., N.Y.), cited in Milan N. Vego, "Yugoslav Ground Forces: A Look at the Past and the Present," Military Review 60 (November 1980): 24. This author has been unable to locate a TO&E for the TDF. This prevents comparison of compatible weapons systems, ammunition, and spare parts.

³Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Intervention in Yugoslavia: An Assessment of the Soviet Option," Strategic Review 5 (Winter 77): 67.

⁴Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms (Praeger, New York, 1976), p. 150.

⁵A. Ross Johnson, Yugoslavia in the Twilight of Tito (Sage Publication, Beverly Hills, 1974), p. 16.

⁶Martin Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan, and Natal A. Tatawy, Yugoslavia: Self-management Socialism and the Challenges (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975), p. 301.

⁷George Hoffman, "Migration and Social Change in Yugoslavia," Problems of Communism 22 (November-December 1973): 16.

⁸Schrenk, p. 301. Credits are in the form of the Federal Fund where 1.94 percent of the GMP from each region is collected and earmarked for loans to the less developed regions. The use of the resources are exclusively decided by the receiving region and administered by a designated regional commercial bank. Kosovo receives 5 percent off the top.

⁹"Croatia Seeks to Invest in Other Republics," Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service, 16 Jan 81, in FBIS-EEU, 19 Jan 81, p. I-8.

¹⁰"Nova Makedonija sees Kosovo Energy Plans as 'Shock'," Skoplje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 31 Jul 80, in FBIS-EEU, 13 Aug 80, p. I-7.

¹¹William E. Griffith, Eastern Europe after the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, P-3983 RAND Corp (October 1968), p. 42.

¹²"Commission Discusses Relations Among Nationalities," Belgrade Domestic Service, 20 Jan 80, in FBIS-EEU, 25 Jun 80, p. I-12.

¹³Schrenk, p. 297.

¹⁴Nicolas R. Land, "The Dialectics of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia," World Politics 27 (3 April 1975): 325.

¹⁵Fred B. Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia (Columbia University Press, New York, 1976), p. 243.

¹⁶Johnson, Twilight, p. 8.

¹⁷Roberts, Nations in Arms, p. 208.

¹⁸Josip Broz-Tito cited in Fitzroy Maclean, Disputed Barricade: The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito (Jonathan Cape, Thirty Bedford Square, London, July 1957), p. 219.

¹⁹Dennison I. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1973, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977), p. 205.

²⁰"Youth Organizations in the JNA," Front (Belgrade, 20 Feb 76), p. 2.

²¹Hoffman, Migration, p. 28.

²²Schrenk, "Self-management Socialism," p. 301.

²³"Territorial Defence of the SFRY," Yugoslav Survey 15 (February 1974): 54.

²⁴Ibid., p. 57.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Tito in Maclean, p. 219.

²⁷Roberts, Nations in Arms, pp. 194-5.

²⁸"Weekly Comments on Domestic Production of Arms," Belgrade TANJUG, 6 Jul 79, in FBIS-EEU, 9 Jul 79, p. I-12.

²⁹"Gen. Cuic Reports on Army Stabilization Measures," Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA, 9 October 80, in FBIS-EEU, 22 Oct 80, p. I-18.

³⁰"Market Socialism after Tito," The Economist, 7 February 1981, p. 84.

³¹"Retail Prices Rose by 30 Percent Last Year," Belgrade Domestic Service, 12 Jan 81, in FBIS-EEU, 13 Jan 81, p. I-1.

V. CONCLUSIONS--SUMMARY

The Yugoslav All-People's Defense system, touted by many as a deterrent against aggression, is flawed--flawed because of changes made by the federal government to ease the socio-ethnic tensions and economic difficulties present in modern-day Yugoslavia. The "self-management" governmental changes, decentralization of party and government, and the economic reform, all place great responsibility on the republics, the autonomous regions, and the communes to develop, train, and equipment elements of the APD.

The APD is designed to work in the mid-intensity environment conventional war with tanks, mechanized infantry combat vehicles, and artillery, with the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) performing joint operations, as well as in the low-intensity environment unconventional (guerrilla) war. In a mid-intensity environment, compatible organization and equipment, and coherent command and control are required. In the low-intensity environment, the support of the people is foremost.

This study has brought to light several deficiencies in vital defense areas that will affect Yugoslavia in both war environments:

1. The Yugoslav People's Army lacks modern war-making equipment. With current cutbacks in defense spending, it is unlikely that this situation will improve in the near future.

2. Command and control of the APD is fragmented, with unclear lines of authority between YPA and TDF. In his latest book, The End of the Tito Era, Slobodan Stankovic discusses this problem in depth and concludes that the National Defense Law and Constitution place the responsibility of command at the National level with the State Presidency, Defense Minister, and Council for National Defense. Obviously the Defense Minister plays the principal role.

When communications links are broken between republics and the national command, the TDF commanders assume command of all elements within their borders. This could mean six or more independent TDF commands, each conducting operations that may or may not conflict with the national or central strategies.

3. Yugoslavia suffers from a poor transportation infrastructure. Flexibility of operations, from artillery support to reinforcement to resupply, is affected. Realistically the Yugoslavs do not expect to engage the enemy in a conventional, mid-intensity conflict for more than 72 hours--time to occupy the invading force long enough to mobilize the APD. Guerrilla warfare is the forte of the APD. As the battle ensues, the resupply of ammunition, weapons, spare parts, food, and medical supplies becomes critical and will probably be severely hampered by the poor transportation facilities.

4. A major strategy of the APD system is to exhaust the enemy, to prolong the defense and to hope that assistance

will be offered. This study asserts that the republics in the southern regions, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the province of Kosovo, will have great difficulty building a credible peacetime force much less maintaining it during wartime. In the event of war, these republics would not be able to logistically support any units forced into their operational area.

5. Probably the most important ingredient is will power--the will of the people to support actively and passively all elements of the APD is somewhat in doubt. Robin Remington states the problem most succinctly when she asks, "Who would be fighting for what?" The Yugoslav warrior will fight, but is the situation similar to WW II when the territorial detachments were "willing to defend only their own immediate areas and unwilling to fight resolutely away from home"? As evidenced by the recent Kosovo disturbances, ethnic animosities are still present across Yugoslavia.

The subjective conclusions reached by this study with regard to physical support of the APD indicate a serious shortfall in peacetime and a potentially dangerous defect during wartime (Table 5).

The republics and provinces given a composite B evaluation are all located in the southern mountainous regions where history indicates the defense will take place. (Slovenia should be excluded since it is a highly industrialized and prosperous republic as witnessed by its income per capita even though it suffers from a dearth of natural and agricultural resources.)

In peacetime these B regions should find it financially difficult to equip and support a TDF. The A regions, although able to devote monies to the APD during peacetime, would soon lose their productive capabilities and transportation infrastructure. In reality, they would become the equivalent of the B regions.

TABLE 5.
SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF REPUBLICS AND PROVINCES

Physical Indicators	Slovenia	Croatia	Serbia	Macedonia	Vojvodina	Kosovo	Montenegro	B-H
Railroads ^a	A	A	A	B	A	B	B	B
Highways ^b	A+	A	A-	B	A	B	B	B-
Wheat Production ^c	B-	A	A+	B	A	B	B-	B+
Iron Resources ^d	B-	B-	B	A	B	B	B	A+
Income per Capita ^e	A+	A	A-	B	A	B-	B	B
Composite Rating	B+	A	A-	B	A-	B	B	B+

SOURCES:

^aJack C. Fisher, Yugoslavia-a Multinational State, Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco, CA., 1966, p. 70.

^b"Road Transport," Yugoslav Survey 15 (Feb 74): 53-66.

^c"Production and Consumption of Wheat," Yugoslav Survey 14 (Feb 73): 55-68.

^dTable 2.

^e"Natural Resources of Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Survey 16 (May 75): 23-50.

Ironically, even with the deficiencies discussed, Yugoslavia has little other choice but the APD. The APD concept and strategy is an outgrowth of foreign and domestic policy; it has been influenced by compromise and accomplishes the following:

1. The APD reinforces Yugoslavia's stated policy of non-alignment. It projects the image of defense from within, supported by the people and their self-management economy.

2. The APD permits a far more credible defense strategy than the massive, expensive post-WW II conventional force.

3. The APD, at least the TDF, is compatible with the attitude of self-management and decentralization of party and government.

4. The APD takes advantage of the pride found in the Yugoslav warrior and the history of Yugoslavia.

When a potential invader evaluates the APD, however, does he envisage a credible deterrent? Will an invasion unite these diverse nations and nationalities or will the nation-state of Yugoslavia rip apart at the seams? This study suggests that the APD is merely an affectation and when closely scrutinized would not provide a credible deterrent.

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
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
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